ينايري هذا هو التقرير الذي ارسله الامين العام للامم المتحدة بان كيمون لمجلس الامن حول قضية الصحراء الغربية والدي توصل موقع ينايري بنسخته الانجليزية الاصلية كاملة قبل قليل .
بتاريخ الثلاثاء 19 أبريل 2016 - 05:06:19 / عدد التعليقات :
Attached is an advance copy of the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara for the information of the members of the Security Council. This report will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/2016/355. 18 April 2016 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara I. Introduction 1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2218 (2015), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2016 and requested me to provide a report to it on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period. It covers developments since my report dated 10 April 2015 (S/2015/246) and describes the situation on the ground, the status and progress of the political negotiations on Western Sahara, my activities and those of my Chef de Cabinet, the implementation of resolution 2218 (2015), and the existing challenges to the Mission's operations and steps taken to address them, as the Council requested in its resolution 2218 (2015). 2. Between 3 and 7 March 2016, I visited the region to make my own contribution to the negotiating process, to pay tribute to the United Nations peacekeeping operation, MINURSO, and its personnel, to see for myself the humanitarian situation on the ground, and to discuss other issues of concern. The Moroccan Government took strong exception to a number of my words and actions during this trip. I regret that it chose to forego seeking clarifications through diplomatic channels, instead issuing a number of public statements and communiques and organizing mass protest demonstrations in Rabat and Laayoune. I have repeatedly made it clear that nothing I had said or done had been meant to take sides, express hostility to the Kingdom of Morocco, or signal any change in the approach of the United Nations to the Western Sahara issue. The results of my trip and subsequent developments are further detailed in the sections on political activities and M1NURSO below. II. Recent developments 3. In additional reaction to certain of my words and actions during my trip, the Foreign Minister of Morocco, Mr. Salaheddine Mezouar, called on me on 14 March 2016 to deliver a letter stating that Morocco was entitled to "immediate, formal and public clarifications about [my] positions, the meaning of [my] actions, as well as [my] intentions concerning [...] the parameters agreed during [my] phone conversation with His Majesty the King Mohammed VI". On 15 March, the Government of Morocco announced a series of measures that have drastically affected MINURSO's ability to carry out its functions, including a significant reduction of the civilian component, more particularly the political segment, as well as cancellation of Morocco's voluntary contribution to MINURSO's functioning. 4. On 16 March, the Permanent Mission of Morocco sent a Note Verbale to my Executive Office transmitting a "list of 84 international civilian personnel of MINURSO and the African Union who should leave the Kingdom of Morocco within three days". On 20 March, the temporary re-assignment from Laayoune to Las Palmas, Spain, or their home countries of those 70 United Nations and three African Union international civilian personnel on the list actually present in Laayoune and their dependents was completed. In response to the critical staff shortage that this created in the Mission, the Department of Field Support has temporarily implemented an improvised concept of logistical support to allow continuity of core administrative functions where possible. Only 28 international civilian staff members remain in Laayoune, while 25 are performing limited functions from Las Palmas. On 21 March, MINURSO redeployed all three of its liaison officers from Dakhla to the Awsard team site at the request of Morocco. 5. In a letter dated 20 March, Polisario Front Secretary-General Abdelaziz criticised Morocco's decision to call for the removal of the civilian staff and reaffirmed the Polisario Front's commitment to MINURSO's mandate and the relevant military agreements. He also "urgently appealed to the Security Council to assume its responsibilities" toward the Mission and its mandate. 6. The current crisis aside, the situation in Western Sahara, as it presents itself to MINURSO, has been generally stable since my last report. However, one potential violation of the ceasefire, as defined in Military Agreement No. 1, occurred. On the evening of 27 February 2016, the Polisario Front informed MINURSO of a shooting incident near Mijek in the demilitarised buffer strip east of the berm. On 29 February, following necessary mine clearance for access, MINURSO located the body of one individual and the remains of four camels. The Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) confirmed having fired 13 gunshots "in the direction of the camels". MINURSO recovered the body, identified by the Polisario Front as a civilian Sahrawi cameleer, and handed it over to the family of the deceased. On 29 February, the Permanent Representative of Morocco, Mr. Omar Hilale, wrote to me providing details on the incident reiterating that, after warnings, shots had been fired in "conditions of very reduced visibility." On 13 March, Mr. Abdelaziz wrote the High Commissioner for Human Rights condemning what he considered "an assassination" and calling on the United Nations to investigate the incident. 7. West of the berm, public life proceeded peacefully and included large gatherings at social events in urban areas without major incident. On the occasions MINURSO was able to witness, an extensive presence of Moroccan security forces was noted. 8. On 4 September 2015, municipal and, for the first time, regional elections were held in Morocco and in Western Sahara. Insofar as MINURSO could ascertain, they were conducted without incident. In a letter dated 1 October 2015, Mr. Hilale informed me that each of the 12 new regions, including the regions of Dakhla and Laayoune, will have broad powers, including the mobilization of financial resources and the establishment of development agencies. 9. In a statement of 4 November 2015, I recalled that the definitive status of Western Sahara is the object of a negotiating process being conducted under my auspices in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, and expressed regret at the absence of genuine negotiations "without preconditions and in good faith to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara". On 5 November, Mr. Hilale called on me to express his country's dismay at the content and timing of the statement. He stressed that the use of the term "definitive status" was new and contradicted Security Council resolutions, which call for "a mutually acceptable political solution". On 17 November, Mr. Abdelaziz wrote to me welcoming my call for true negotiations, reaffirming the support of the Polisario Front for the work of my Personal 2 Envoy, and warning that "we are at a crisis. The conflict cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely". 10. King Mohammed VI visited Laayoune in November 2015 and Dakhla in February 2016. In Laayoune, on 6 November, he delivered his annual speech on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the "Green March". The King stated that the autonomy initiative "is the most Morocco can offer" and that "ts implementation hinges on achieving a final political settlement within the framework of the United Nations Organisation". The King elaborated that integration of the territory into a unified Morocco would be conducted principally through the "Development Model for the Southern Provinces". He also stressed that revenues from natural resources would continue to be invested for the benefit of the local population in consultation and coordination with them and promised that they would benefit from an important number of infrastructure projects. He further added that the legislators elected by the citizens were the "true representatives of the inhabitants". On 12 November and 15 February, Mr. Hilale wrote to me providing further details on this initiative, including that it would consist of projects in the phosphate, agricultural, fisheries, and tourism sectors and that its global budget would be USD 7.7 billion. 11. In his letter of 17 November 2015, Mr. Abdelaziz expressed "deep concern" at the content of the King's speech, which he called "intentionally provocative and aimed clearly at drawing a line under the United Nations political process". Subsequently, Mr. Abdelaziz further stated that the Polisario Front would not exclude resuming the armed struggle, since the referendum that had been agreed in exchange for the 1991 cease-fire had not taken place. He also denounced the King's visit to Laayoune as contradicting international law. 12. In the refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, public life and social activities were conducted peacefully and in a relatively calm atmosphere. The severe living conditions, already affected by a continuing decrease in humanitarian aid, deteriorated further in October as a result of prolonged heavy rains that devastated the five camps, destroying many of the refugees' mud-brick homes, infrastructures, and food supplies. The extensive damage prompted the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Food Programme (WFP) to launch a joint flash appeal for USD 19.8 million. 13. The Polisario Front held public events on the occasion of its forty-second anniversary on 10 May 2015. From 16 to 22 December 2015, the Polisario Front held its 14th General Peoples' Congress with the reported participation of 2,472 delegates. The Congress' final communiquÿ accused Morocco of intransigence in its refusal to resume negotiations. It welcomed my intention to visit the region and the intensified efforts of my Personal Envoy as a new opportunity, and expressed its readiness to engage constructively in the search for a settlement. However, it also warned that Morocco's defiance of the efforts of the United Nations could lead to grave consequences. On 23 December, Mr. Abdelaziz was re-elected as its Secretary General. In January, he appointed new officials in several domains. 14. On 23 June 2015, the Polisario Front deposited with the Swiss Federal Council, in its capacity as depositary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, a unilateral declaration stating that the Polisario Front, as the authority representing the people of Western Sahara, undertook to apply these Conventions and Additional Protocol I to the conflict between the Polisario Front and the Kingdom of Morocco. On 26 June, the Council notified the High Contracting Parties of receipt of the Polisario Front's declaration. On 9 July, it also transmitted a communication from the Kingdom of Morocco dated 30 June in which it rejected this declaration and considered it as null and void, adding that the depositary had exceeded its prerogatives by accepting it. 15. During the reporting period, the Moroccan authorities addressed 11 letters to me reiterating their support for the United Nations political process, stressing that Morocco's autonomy initiative is the only solution, and affirming that Morocco respects human rights fully and has made extensive investments in the territory. They also conveyed concerns about what they described as the deplorable humanitarian and human rights situation in the refugee camps near Tindouf. For his part, Mr. Abdelaziz wrote to me on ten occasions, deploring what he described as Moroccan obstruction, as well as raising allegations of human rights violations, the disproportionate use of force, and illicit exploitation of natural resources. He further called repeatedly on the United Nations to implement appropriate remedies, arrange the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners, and institute a human rights monitoring mechanism for Western Sahara. III. Political activities 16. After publication of my previous report on 10 April 2015 (S/2015/246), I decided to dispatch my then Chef de Cabinet, Ms. Susana Malcorra, to communicate my understanding of the issues at stake and give new impetus to the negotiating process on Western Sahara. She carried letters from me to King Mohammed VI and Mr. Abdelaziz reiterating my personal commitment and political engagement and calling on the parties to show a stronger political will and return to the negotiating table. 17. In mid-June, Ms. Malcorra delivered letters to Mr. Abdelaziz, while an adviser to King Mohammed VI, Dr. Abdelatif Menouni, received her in the absence of the King. In both letters, I emphasized the dangers posed by the changing regional dynamics, including the spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Middle East and North Africa, the worsening migration pressures across the Mediterranean, and the illicit trade in drugs and other contraband in the Sahel. In my view, these dynamics required the international community to make intensified efforts to address protracted conflicts. In particular, I drew the leaders' attention to the potential dangers related to the radicalization of youth, which could present a danger to peace and security in the region and beyond. Given challenges that no single actor could address alone, I underscored that, more than ever, the status quo was no longer an option. I also asked Ms. Malcorra to convey that, seven years after the submission of their respective proposals to the Security Council, the parties had yet to bridge the divide between their mutually exclusive positions, and neither party had succeeded in winning the other party to its proposal and moving toward a solution. I requested my Chef de Cabinet to stress that the resulting lack of regional integration had real effects on the populations of the region. 18. In his response of 9 August 2015, Mr. Abdelaziz welcomed my call for the resumption of negotiations and my expressed commitment to visit Western Sahara and the region, and called these steps "an important demonstration of the resolve of the United Nations to end the current stalemate and fulfill the promise of a self-determination referendum for the Sahrawi people". For his part, in his letter of 24 August 2015, the King indicated that "Morocco has a sincere desire to put an end to this regional dispute" and that its "autonomy initiative is the 4 only way toward a final solution". He further stressed that he shared my objective to re-launch the political process under the sole auspices of the United Nations. He also added that this shared objective required that Algeria demonstrate the political will to achieve it, given its "historic and political responsibility in this dispute". 19. At my request, my Personal Envoy, Mr. Christopher Ross, moved to intensify his efforts through bilateral consultations and shuttle diplomacy. His objective was to foster new ideas with a view to resuming the political negotiations between the parties, in accordance with the Manhasset formula. Working toward this objective, Mr. Ross conducted four trips to the region: from 31 August to 10 September 2015; 19 to 28 October 2015; 22 to 30 November 2015; and 16 to 25 February 2016. 20. In Rabat, my Personal Envoy met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Mr. Salaheddine Mezouar, and the new Minister-Delegate, formerly the Ministry's SecretaryGeneral, Mr. Nasser Bourita. Encouraging my Personal Envoy to visit as often as he wished to pursue his shuttle diplomacy, Mr. Mezouar reiterated Morocco's commitment to the negotiating process under United Nations facilitation. Mr. Bourita, for his part, affirmed that the basis of the process was the "2004 understanding", which consisted, in his view, of a political solution that did not bring the status of Western Sahara into question, inasmuch as "the Sahara is already Moroccan". 21. My Personal Envoy's Moroccan interlocutors introduced two of their long-standing positions as new ideas to be explored in shuttle diplomacy. In September 2015, they asked that he explore bringing Algeria to the table as a formal party in the negotiation process, maintaining that the continuation of the status quo was due to Algeria's absence. In October 2015, they suggested that he promote an exchange of views on self-determination. In Morocco's view, Mr. Bourita stated, self-determination can occur in the constant exercise of daily human rights, in particular pursuit of economic, social, and cultural development instead of in the conduct of a formal exercise. 22. Following an interview with the Spanish news agency EFE in which Foreign Minister Mezouar was widely believed to have stated that my Personal Envoy would not be allowed to visit Western Sahara in the future, this issue was raised in the Security Council in November 2015. It was defused after the Permanent Representative of Morocco assured members that there were no impediments to Mr. Ross's travel. Mr. Bourita stated that, while Morocco did not question his right to travel, it was a question of agreeing whether the timing was "opportune". Mr. Ross's last visit to Western Sahara took place in the spring of 2013. 23. In Rabouni, my Personal Envoy met with Polisario Front Secretary-General Abdelaziz in October 2015 and with the Polisario Front negotiating team headed by Mr. Khatri Adduh during each visit. Mr. Ross exchanged views on the negotiating process and expressed the satisfaction of the United Nations and key international stakeholders with the Polisario Front's stated readiness to enter negotiations on a more flexible basis, no longer insisting on an immediate referendum, on condition that Morocco show similar flexibility. 24. When my Personal Envoy conveyed the two ideas from Rabat, the Polisario Front representatives warned that the Moroccan objective was to stir confusion in the process and delay it further. Reiterating the movement's commitment to peaceful resolution of the conflict, they said that their patience had limits and that they could not understand why the United Nations was accepting what they saw as Moroccan efforts to "redefine the negotiating parameters". They maintained that Morocco had effectively rejected the negotiation process since 2012 and lacked any respect for the United Nations and the Polisario Front. 25. In Algeria, President Bouteflika confirmed that his country' s position remained unchanged, reiterating that Algeria would accept any solution that the Polisario Front endorsed. Underscoring that his country was not a party to the conflict, the Minister of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Mr. Ramtane Lamamra, rejected Moroccan efforts to "bilateralise" the Western Sahara conflict as a "regional dispute" between Algeria and Morocco. He recalled that, since 1975, the conflict had opposed the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front. Responding to Morocco's query on self-determination, Mr. Lamamra indicated that Algeria remained attached to that right as defined in the United Nations context and saw no further reason to elaborate. For his part, the Minister of Maghreb Affairs, the African Union, and the League of Arab States, Mr. Abdelkader Messahel, stated that the preferred solution for Algeria remained for the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination through a referendum based on "one person, one vote". 26. In Nouakchott, my Personal Envoy met with Prime Minister Ould Hademine on two occasions, as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his Minister-Delegate. As on previous occasions, all reiterated Mauritania's long-standing position of"positive neutrality" regarding the Western Sahara negotiating process. The Prime Minister repeated his warning that the continuing stalemate in the Western Sahara negotiations risked undermining regional stability. He also stressed the important family and cultural ties between Sahrawis and Mauritanians. 27. My Personal Envoy also continued his consultations with members of the Group of Friends for Western Sahara, visiting Madrid, Paris, London, and Washington, D.C. and meeting with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister in New York. In these discussions, my Personal Envoy's interlocutors reiterated their support for his efforts. For his part, my Personal Envoy reiterated the possible dangers of the ongoing stalemate and called on his interlocutors to help address the situation. As on previous occasions, he also underscored the need for more flexibility in the parties' positions to enable the process to move forward. In Madrid, he also expressed his deep appreciation for the continuing facilitation of his mission by the Government of Spain through the provision of a Spanish Air Force aircraft for his travels within North Africa. 28. In light of the ongoing stalemate and my desire to visit MINURSO, I visited the region from 3 to 7 March following several discussions on the preparations of the trip. I wanted very much to begin in Rabat in response to the 14 April 2014 invitation of King Mohammed VI, but this proved impossible because his agenda did not permit him to receive me. Regrettably, I had been obliged to cancel earlier plans to visit the region in November and January due to possibility of a visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On 4 February 2016, the King conveyed an invitation to meet with him to discuss a range of issues, including Western Sahara, as well as mutually convenient dates for a future visit to the region, at the 27th Arab summit to be held in Marrakesh in April. Although I offered to begin my trip by meeting a designated representative of the King, the Moroccan side demurred. They also insisted that any visit to Laayoune be preceded by a visit to Rabat. I therefore travelled instead to my other stops -- Nouakchott, the Smara refugee camp near Tindouf, Rabouni, the MINURSO team site in Bit Lahlou, and Algiers -- with the intention of subsequently visiting both Rabat and Laayoune, assuming mutually agreed dates can be found. 29. My visit had four objectives. First, I wanted to make my own assessment and contribution to the search for a settlement. Second, I sought to visit MINURSO and pay tribute to its civilian personnel and military observers, who serve under very difficult conditions. Third, in the first visit to the refugee camps by a Secretary-General since 1998, I wanted to bear witness to this protracted humanitarian plight. Fourth, I desired to exchange views on other issues of mutual interest with relevant leaders. My movements were greatly facilitated by the generous offer of the Government of Spain to make a Spanish Air Force aircraft available for my travel in the region. 30. In Nouakchott, Rabouni, and Algiers, I held political discussions with the leaders of Mauritania, the Polisario Front, and Algeria on the status of the negotiating process and how to make progress. In the Smara refugee camp, I saw first-hand the deep emotions and profound frustrations resulting from more than 40 years of living without perspectives for a better future. Unable to leave my car due to the press of the crowds, I met with youth representatives later the same day in Rabouni. I witnessed anger and bitterness against the international community, the United Nations, Morocco, and the Polisario Front alike. I recoiled at the inhumane conditions and extremely harsh environment in which the refugees live. With every interlocutor, I stressed the urgent need for progress toward a mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. I also committed myself to doing more to encourage greater humanitarian assistance for the camps. V. Activities of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara A.Operational activities 31. As of 31 March 2016, the military component of MINURSO stood at 244 personnel, eleven of whom are female, against the authorized strength of 246. The military component remains deployed at nine team sites and a liaison office in Tindouf, Algeria. 32. From 1 April 2015 to 31 March 2016, MINURSO conducted 8,369 ground patrols and 262 aerial patrols and visited units of the RMA and the military forces of Polisario Front to monitor adherence to the military agreements. West of the berm, MINURSO military observers regularly visited 585 units, 29 training areas and 316 observation posts of the RMA, and monitored 399 notified operational activities. East of the berm, the military observers regularly visited 78 units, ten training areas and 31 observation posts of Polisario Front military forces, and monitored four notified operational activities. MINURSO also monitored one demonstration that supporters of the Polisario Front had organized close to the berm, to verify its exclusively civilian nature and defuse or prevent possible tensions. 33. As of 31 March 2016, at the team site level, local cooperation has been maintained by both parties. Due to the limited logistical support and capacities available as a result of the withdrawal of MINURSO civilian staff, field locations are required to strictly control the consumption of water, fuel, and other supplies to preserve stocks. 34. West of the berm, apart the potential breach of the ceasefire mentioned in paragraph 6, MINURSO recorded no other new violations by the RMA, in addition to the nine longstanding violations listed in my previous report (S/2015/246, para. 25). The RMA continued redeploying its military personnel to strong points established on the berm from its second line of defense 15 kilometers from the berm, a maj or long-standing violation since September 2008. As at 14 March 2016, 55 observation posts remained operational. The RMA continued to contest notifcations of long-standing violations of the ceasefire regime with claims of "operational necessities" unrelated to the ceasefire requirements. On 6 November 2015, the RMA ordered the temporary deployment of an additional contingent of the Royal Moroccan Guard to the area outside Laayoune to reinforce security during the visit of King Mohammed VI. East of the berm, MINURSO observed and recorded one new violation, the Polisario Front Military Forces' relocation of two units away from their original location, along with the three long-standing violations listed in my previous report (S/2015/246, para. 25). 35. Reacting to an entry formality west of the berm that Morocco holds is foreseen in the Status of Mission Agreement, the Polisario Front implemented a new entry procedure east of the berm on 15 April 2015, affixing a stamp on passports of MINURSO military and civilian staff members. Non-acceptance of passports bearing this stamp west of the berm resulted in an interruption of MINURSO personnel rotation and restrictions on deliveries to team sites east of the berm, affecting MINURSO operations such as patrolling. MINURSO resumed full operations on 9 May following intensive dialogue with the Polisario Front that resulted in indefinite suspension of the measure. However, the Polisario Front cautioned that the entry requirement could be re-imposed if the political process remained stalled or the perception of double standards in UN treatment of the parties was not corrected. On 25 June 2015, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations addressed separate letters to the Government of Morocco and to the Secretary-General of the Polisario Front calling on them both to respect the status, privileges, and immunities of MINURSO in this regard. 36. In a letter dated 9 August 2015, Mr. Abdelaziz criticized Morocco's entry procedures, as well as its requirement that M1NURSO vehicles west of the berm carry Moroccan license plates and that mail to localities west of the berm be addressed to Morocco, not Western Sahara, as violations of its status as a non-self-governing territory. He called for these and other measures to be rectified to restore the credibility of the United Nations and confidence in its neutral role in Western Sahara. 37. These events subsequently prompted MINURSO to review its logistics, operations, and contingency plans to enable it to address possible restrictions of its operations, adapt to a changing regional security environment, and ensure continuity of operations for 90 days. A separate logistics hub was subsequently proposed in Tifariti, east of the berm, and medical staff from the Military Medical Unit were permanently stationed east of the berm to ensure supply and staff well-being, as well as to increase preparedness against any potential threats and interruptions. The latter constitutes a severe overstretch of the existing medical and logistic capacity of the Mission. To meet these new requirements, and as a first step, MINURSO requests 11 additional paramedics and three additional doctors for the military Medical Unit that Bangladesh has provided. 38. The Mission's Force Commander held regular meetings with military representatives of both parties to maintain the channels of communication and to exercise due diligence in ensuring the observance of Military Agreement No. 1. From 16 to 18 October 2015, DPKO Military Advisor Lieutenant General Maqsood Ahmed visited Western Sahara and the refugee camps near Tindouf and met with representatives of both parties. 39. Landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) continued to endanger the lives of MINURSO military observers and logistical teams, as well as local and nomadic populations. As of the end of March 2016, a total of 52 cluster strike areas and 42 minefields remained to be addressed east of the berm. The departure of all international staff overseeing the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)-managed demining project as part of MINURSO has however resulted in the suspension of all demining activities since 20 March. Prior to this, two accidents related to landmines and other ERW occurred east of the berm involving five civilians. A total of 15 accidents related to landmines or ERW occurred west of the berm, causing injury to 21 civilians and eight soldiers and the deaths of two civilians and one soldier. 40. Prior to 20 March 2016, in response to these threats, the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) that UNMAS operates conducted clearance of landmines and ERWs, route verification, and landmine safety training activities east of the berm in support of the Mission's ceasefire monitoring efforts. MACC teams released a total of 7,382,251 m2 of land and destroyed 1,797 items, including 181 cluster sub-munitions, 144 unexploded ordnance items, and 45 anti-tank mines, as well as 1,427 rounds of small arms ammunition in areas where MINURSO military observers and international logistical staff were operating. Of the 21 cluster strike areas that were cleared, two were located on main supply routes and roads that MINURSO military observers frequently used. The remaining areas were located around team sites. A total of 29 km of patrol routes were also verified to facilitate MINURSO patrols to the east of the berm. These activities saved lives and increased freedom of movement not only for United Nations personnel, but also for local populations. 41. The RMA reported clearance of more than 220,360,000 m2 of land to the west of the berm and destruction of 9,873 items, including anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, unexploded ordnance, and small arms ammunition. 42. Prior to 20 March 2016, the MACC worked with both parties to the conflict on mine action initiatives with the aim of better ascertaining the threat and impact of landmines and other ERWs through Western Sahara. Consistent coordination and communication was maintained in this regard. 43. The potential for regional instability and insecurity has affected the operational environment of MINURSO increasingly. Primary responsibility for the protection of the Mission rests with Morocco, the Polisario Front, and Algeria respectively. The parties and neighboring countries have taken additional measures to prevent radical groups from infiltrating. However, the Mission's unarmed observers are increasingly exposed to growing regional threats. The increased competition between A1-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant for preeminence in the region creates the potential for additional radical actions against countries perceived to be supporting international counterterrorist interventions and possibly the United Nations. 44. During the year, Moroccan media reported on the dismantling of terrorist cells in Laayoune on at least three different occasions. The Moroccan authorities subsequently confirmed these details to my Special Representative, which prompted a constructive discussion between the MINURSO leadership and Moroccan authorities on enhancing protective measures for United Nations property and staff west of the berm. 45. For its part, the Polisario Front regularly updated the Mission on possible threats, such as terrorist attacks and kidnappings, and suggested increasing protective measures and vigilance. As a precautionary measure and due to the lack of MINURSO capability to verify such threats, MINURSO has reduced all ground patrols to a 50km radius around its five team sites east of the berm. The Polisario Front insists that all daylight patrols toward the Mauritanian border be conducted under their armed escort, which has frequently been met with protest from the Moroccan authorities, who consider it a serious limitation of MINURSO's freedom of movement. 46. MINURSO has asked the RMA and the Polisario Front to augment their protection of its team sites by stationing quick reaction forces and increasing the number of security guards, which is not always feasible for the parties to implement. MINURSO has also increased its alertness and situational awareness to improve the security and safety of its military and civilian staff. United Nations Department of Safety and Security experts regularly visited team sites and the liaison office in Tindouf to review the security arrangements in place and consult the local representatives of the parties on security matters. Team site personnel have been duly sensitized to the threat, with an added emphasis on security and safety drills. The departure of the international security personnel whose names appeared on Morocco's list of 16 March 2016 has reduced the security management capacity of the Mission, leaving M1NURSO unable to fully and independently assess and strengthen the safety and security of its remaining personnel. B.Substantive civilian activities 47. Throughout the reporting period, my Special Representative maintained constructive contacts with the parties, primarily through their respective coordination offices. 48. West of the berm, M1NURSO's access to local interlocutors continued to remain restricted to the Morocco's MINURSO coordination office, as well as the Moroccan civil and military authorities, with whom my Special Representative and relevant MINURSO staff met regularly on operational matters. MINURSO also met with a number of foreign visitors, including diplomats, legislators, journalists, and academics. However, MINURSO's substantive activities have come to a halt following the departure of the political segment of the Mission in March 2016 at Morocco's request. 49. The recent crisis and the local media coverage that ensued affected the perception of MINURSO and United Nations impartiality west of the berm, creating tensions and adding pressure on the remaining personnel. The longstanding issue of MINURSO vehicles operating with Moroccan license plates west of the berm continues as described in previous reports (see S/2015/246, para. 40). Moroccan license plates must be removed and replaced by United Nations plates when MINURSO vehicles cross east of the berm and travel outside the area of operations, inducing logistical and administrative complications. Despite the clear provisions 10 of the Status of Mission Agreement, the Moroccan authorities have not implemented their March 2014 verbal agreement to gradually replace Moroccan license plates with United Nations plates for M1NURSO vehicles (see S/2014/258, para. 50). 50. In the refugee camps south of Tindouf, MINURSO and the United Nations agencies enjoy unhindered access and interaction with Polisario Front representatives and refugees, as well as with local and international civil society organizations. Notwithstanding the difficulties experienced in May 2015 (see above, para. 35), the Mission leadership maintained constructive cooperation with the Polisario Front on operational matters. However, as a result of the withdrawal of MINURSO's international civilian component, the United Nations is now the subject of additional criticism. C. Challenges to the operations of the Mission 51. The parties continue to have significantly divergent interpretations of MINURSO's mandate. As I have reported repeatedly, Morocco views MINURSO's role as limited to monitoring the ceasefire and military matters, as well as support for demining and for UNHCR's confidence-building measures. The Polisario Front considers the central purpose of MINURSO to remain the organization of a referendum of self-determination, for which monitoring the ceasefire is instrumental. For the United Nations, the Mission's mandate is defined in successive Security Council resolutions. To respond to the expectations of the Security Council, effective implementation of the mandate of M1NURSO requires that the Mission be able to perform the full range of standard peacekeeping functions that United Nations operations around the world perform. Tensions related to the parties' divergent mandate interpretations and, more broadly, to the negotiating process and the United Nations' understanding of that process can affect the Mission's operations. This has adverse effects on the credibility of the Mission and the United Nations with the parties and population, impeding its ability to fully implement the tasks that the Security Council has set forth. 52. The temporary reassignment of MINURSO's international personnel from Laayoune to various locations has severely affected its capacity to continue its functions. This is particularly critical for logistical operations that need to operate on both sides of the berm unimpeded. Due to the joint nature of the Mission, the loss of critical logistical and administrative staff now jeopardises its field operations. The Mission is now unable to sustain basic but critical functions such as driving supply vehicles across the berm (which requires international drivers due to the requirements of the parties), as well as mechanical repair and maintenance of key equipment and infrastructure required to keep remote locations functional. The loss of such capacities creates the risk of a sudden interruption of the Mission's military activities beyond the risk created by the ongoing degradation of the provision of basic supplies. The withdrawal of core parts of the international civilian components also significantly affected financial and administrative controls over the Mission's funds and assets, at best creating serious delays in processes. 53. Beyond the operational impact, the withdrawal of the international civilian component has seriously compromised the capacity of the Mission to perform the mandate established by the Security Council. The cancellation of Morocco's voluntary contribution of some US$3 million per year, including for accommodating and meals for military observers, immediately created an additional unbudgeted cost for MINURSO. The military component will struggle J.1 to maintain its monitoring of the ceasefire given its reliance on civilian capabilities and technical functions for sustainability. Other key tasks and standard peacekeeping functions, such as assessments of and reporting on local conditions that may affect the Mission's operations and the political process, have been discontinued. VI. Humanitarian activities and human rights A. Persons unaccounted for in the conflict 54. The International Committee of the Red Cross, playing its role as neutral intermediary, continued to work with the parties and families concerned in treating the cases of persons still unaccounted for in relation to the past hostilities. B. Assistance to and protection of Western Saharan refugees 55. In accordance with its mandate, UNHCR continued to provide international protection to Western Saharan refugees living in the five camps near Tindouf, Algeria, and, together with its partners, deliver life-saving assistance and other livelihood activities targeting vulnerable refugees and youth in particular. This included multisector activities in the areas of protection, shelter, water and sanitation, health, nutrition, education, provision of non-food items, and a renewed focus on livelihoods. UNHCR continued to carry out its mandated responsibilities in protection and basic services with a community-based approach. Pending the registration of the refugees in the camps near Tindouf, the humanitarian assistance that UNHCR and WFP provide continues to be based on a population planning figure of 90,000 vulnerable refugees, with WFP furnishing an additional 35,000 food rations to persons with poor nutritional status._In March 2016, UNHCR conducted an initial technical mission to identify areas in which support and advice could be provided. 56. Further to the heavy floods of October 2015 (see para. 12), UNHCR led the inter-agency emergency response with other humanitarian actors in close collaboration with the Government of Algeria, the Algerian Red Crescent, and partners on the ground. UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, and WHO launched an inter-agency appeal of USD 19.8 million. UNHCR distributed urgently needed shelter and relief items, including 4,205 emergency family tents and 15,822 essential lifesustaining relief items. Evacuation of stagnant water and an awareness campaign on the danger of most common water-borne diseases were simultaneously conducted. WFP distributed 205 million tons of food commodities in the immediate aftermath of the floods; 85,000 individual rations were distributed in early November. UNICEF set up 57 temporary learning facilities and distributed some 36,000 school supplies allowing all children to take their exams. Also, 15 schools and kindergartens were rehabilitated and 17 temporary health facilities, as well as five temporary child-friendly spaces, were established. 57. Due to lack of funding, shelter rehabilitation activities could only target the 2,000 most vulnerable families out of 17,841 families affected. As a result, many families continue to live in temporary tents and in damaged houses, or have found accommodation with other refugee families. The second phase of the emergency response, along with the rehabilitation of 50 school classrooms, continues in 2016. With only USD 11.9 million received so far, the inter-agency appeal is 40% under funded. 12 58. Similarly, funding shortfalls compelled WFP to adjust the number of food items during the year, resulting in a less diversified food basket. Between August and October 2015, it was forced to reduce the food ration by up to 20%. In the health sector, UNHCR and its partners continued to cover up to 80% of the needs in the camps. Chronic conditions such as hypertension, diabetes anaemia, and kidney failure remained the main health concerns. A health information system was piloted, allowing the provision of accurate public health indicators on a regular basis. Anaemia and stunting prevention programmes targeted some 12,000 children under 5 years of age and 8,000 pregnant and lactating women in 2015. In March 2016, UNHCR and WFP conducted a joint mission to assess the food security situation of the Western Saharan refugees and to review the quality of on-going food and nutrition-related activities. A key challenge in the health sector remains how to retain skilled staff due to low financial support. 59. UNHCR, through its partner organizations, also provided financial support to primary and intermediate school teachers in the five camps and ensured that that all children between the ages of 6 and 17 were enrolled in school. Growing numbers of young refugees were enrolled in vocational training courses and other skills training. Twenty-five students received scholarships and are now pursuing higher studies in Algerian universities. WFP continued to support the school feeding programme. UNHCR also continued to ensure the supply of potable water to all refugees living in the five camps. Preventive plans for the maintenance and rehabilitation of water facilities were implemented to optimize the use of the existing water infrastructure, which remains below the standard daily quantity. Efforts and resources continue to be focused on the extension of the water distribution network in all camps. Hygiene kits were distributed to 38,450 women and girls of reproductive age. 60. UNHCR has been working in close collaboration with relevant basic service providers to ensure that quality referral and response services are available in terms of legal, medical, and psychosocial support. 61. UNHCR and its partners initiated a multi-year livelihoods strategy with a special focus on youth empowerment. For this purpose, UNHCR deployed a livelihoods mission in March 2016 to identify income-generating opportunities for youth in the camps near Tindouf. These activities were articulated in the multi-year strategy developed as a result of the mission. An Innovation Centre on information technology, communications skills, and management was established to allow young refugees to follow online courses and university studies. UNHCR also maintained other livelihood initiatives and quick impact projects, including three bakeries and soap factories, as part of the income-generation projects. Given the current serious funding gaps in its assistance program in the camps, which is only 6% funded, UNHCR will continue to sensitize donor countries and plan donor briefings, together with its partners, with the aim of obtaining more funding for this refugee situation, which is the most protracted under its mandate. 62. Underfunding continued to affect the regular refugee programme despite high-level efforts to mobilise additional assistance. On 22 July, following her visit to the region (see paras. 16-17), my Chef de Cabinet convened a meeting of Permanent Representatives from existing and potential donor countries in New York to encourage the mobilisation of additional financial resources to address the shortfalls, particularly in food assistance. 13 C. Confidence-Building measures 63. All confidence-building measures programme (CBM) activities as stipulated in the Plan of Action of 2012 were suspended in June 2014. As it continues its consultation and cooperation with both parties, UNHCR remains ready to facilitate the prompt resumption of the family visits and cultural seminars programme through the existing coordination mechanism. 64. Over 12,000 individuals are registered to benefit from the family visits programme. UNHCR remains committed to the mandate and to the principles of the CBM programme and has thus maintained its minimum operational capacity to respond immediately at such time as CBM activities resume. It is imperative that the Programme continues to link the population divided by the conflict for the last 40 years. D. Human rights 65. As jointly agreed with the Kingdom of Morocco, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights deployed a technical mission to Laayoune and Dakhla in Western Sahara from 12 to 18 April 2015. This mission, which was preceded by meetings with Government officials in Rabat, enabled the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to gather first-hand information and gain greater understanding of the human rights situation and challenges in Western Sahara and to explore forms of future cooperation to ensure effective human rights protection for all. MINURSO provided logistical support during the mission. 66. In Laayoune and in Dakhla in Western Sahara, the OHCHR delegation met with numerous interlocutors, including local authorities, civil society, and victims of human rights violations and their relatives. The delegation also met with ex-prisoners of the Polisario Front. Although the delegation was allowed to meet interlocutors of its choice as agreed with the Government of Morocco, its meetings with civil society and victims were monitored, and a few incidents of reprisals were reported. In order to further assess existing protection mechanisms, the delegation also met with representatives of the Conseil National des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH) offices in Laayoune and in Dakhla to seek their views concerning needs for, and gaps in, human rights protection at the local level and ways through which OHCHR can assist to close these gaps and strengthen existing capacities. The delegation gathered information on a variety of alleged human rights violations. It also received information about existing and planned projects in the economic, social and cultural spheres in Western Sahara and witnessed some of these in Laayoune and Dakhla at first hand. 67. During the reporting period, the Government of Morocco extended four invitations to special procedures mandate holders of the Human Rights Council in addition to a number of others that remain outstanding from previous years. The Special Rapporteur on the right to food and the Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity undertook two missions to Dakhla in Western Sahara on 10 October 2015 and 19-20 January 2016 respectively. The dates for a follow-up visit by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment are under discussion. 68. According to various sources, the Moroccan authorities continued to routinely prevent or disperse gatherings focused on the right to self-determination, discriminatory employment policies, and other socio-economic issues during the reporting period. According to the same sources, Moroccan law enforcement officials also block access to demonstrations and often used 14 excessive or unnecessary force in repressing demonstrations, including during the OHCHR mission. In several cases, protesters and activists were allegedly subjected to arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, and imprisonment on ostensibly trumped-up charges solely for exercising their rights to freedom of expression or peaceful assembly. Local human rights groups reported that some persons injured during demonstrations were denied or did not receive equal and timely access to medical treatment or services. Others refrained from seeking medical assistance at hospitals out of fear of reprisals from security personnel on the scene. However, according to the Moroccan authorities, the right of assembly is guaranteed to all recognized entities by law unless its provisions are violated or it is judged that the gathering is disturbing public order. They added that, on this basis, a large number of demonstrations took place without incident during the reporting period. 69. On 12 January 2016, at least 19 Western Saharans, members of the Field Coordination of Unemployed Saharan Graduates, reportedly went on a hunger strike for almost two weeks, protesting economic and social discrimination and demanding equal employment opportunities. The security forces allegedly surrounded the group's building and prevented family members and friends from visiting, thereby restricting the protesters' access to water. This led to a drastic deterioration in the health of the majority of the strikers. On 23 January, electricity at that building was reportedly cut in an apparent attempt to force an end to the strike. On 26 January, OHCHR sent a Note Verbale to the Permanent Mission of Morocco in Geneva requesting information on the circumstances of the incident and the measures that Morocco had taken to address the demands of the group. On 30 March, the Permanent Mission of Morocco responded that, after a multidisciplinary commission's visit to the group, the participating doctors reported that the hunger strike was fictitious and that the strikers had eaten during their visit. The Mission's response also concluded that each time the hunger strikers simulated fainting they were evacuated to a hospital for medical treatment. 70. The 21 Western Saharans that belong to the Gdeim Izik protest camp group continued to serve the prison sentences, including life sentences, that a military court had imposed in 2013.a The new Code on Military Justice that took effect in July 2015 ending military court trials of civilians (No. 108-13) did not retroactively benefit this group, while the group's petition of the verdict remained pending at the Cassation Court.. Torture and ill-treatment in places of deprivation of liberty, including as a result of overcrowding and limited access to medical care, continued to be reported. In a letter of 16 February 2016 addressed to me, the Permanent Representative of Morocco confirmed that a decision has been made to designate the CNDH as the national preventive mechanism for inspecting places of detention, as envisaged by the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, subject to parliamentary approval. 71. A number of Western Saharan human rights groups that had previously sought official recognition from the Moroccan authorities were not accorded legal status during the reporting period. The Moroccan authorities' harassment of Western Saharan human rights defenders and activists continued. Unnecessary restrictions were reportedly imposed on some human rights a S/2013/220, paras. 14 and 81-82; and S/2014/258, para. 81; S/2015/246, para. 57. 15 defenders and activists seeking to enter and leave Western Sahara west of the berm, thereby limiting their freedom of movement. According to the Moroccan authorities, 34,943 foreigners from more than 120 countries visited Western Sahara west of berm during the reporting period, including human rights organizations, diplomats, and journalists. However, local authorities were reported to be continuing to restrict access for a number of foreign visitors, including journalists, human rights defenders, and activists, expelling some and preventing others from visiting. 72. In its concluding observations with regard to Morocco's fourth periodic report, adopted on 8 October 2015, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) of the Economic and Social Council welcomed the adoption of several measures promoting the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights by the population. That said, available information indicates that Western Saharans continue to face discrimination in the enjoyment of their economic, social, and cultural rights. The Committee recommended that Morocco strengthen its efforts, under the auspices of the United Nations, to find a solution to the issue of the right to self-determination for Western Sahara (E/C. 12/MAR/CO/4), which in its view is needed to permit Western Saharans to fully enjoy their economic, social, and cultural rights. The Special Rapporteur on the right to food, visiting Dakhla in October 2015, stated in her report that she had witnessed significant efforts to develop infrastructure and that many were benefiting from agricultural projects and fisheries. However, she echoed some of the CESCR's recommendations, highlighting that poverty continued to affect the population disproportionately and that it was not reaping the benefits of the considerable investments being made. (A!HRC/31/51/Add.2). 73. Moroccan and international investments in Western Sahara and its territorial waters continue to be a subject of contention between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario Front. On 10 December 2015, the General Court of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered a judgment in the case of Polisario Front v. Council of the European Union (Case T- 512/12), granting the Polisario Front standing before the court and annulling the EU-Moroccan Trade Agreement on agricultural products, processed agricultural products, and fish and fisheries products insofar as it applies to Western Sahara. Morocco has denounced this judgment as politically motivated. On 19 February, the Council of the European Union brought an appeal against the ECJ decision , alleging that the General Court's decision had erred in law on six grounds, including by holding that the Polisario Front had the capacity to bring proceedings before the courts of the European Union and by holding that the Polisario Front was directly and individually concerned by the case (Case C- 104/16 P). 74. The offices of CNDH in Laayoune and Dakhla continued carrying out a range of activities, including monitoring demonstrations, organizing capacity building activities, and visiting places of detention and medical facilities. The CNDH offices continued to prepare reports and submit recommendations on certain human rights issues to relevant authorities. In 2015, the CNDH received over 300 complaints, the majority of which concerned allegations of human rights violations by security forces and local authorities, as well as conditions of detention. Progress was reported concerning the authorities' timely response to such complaints. However, according to several sources, the majority of the authorities' responses remained insufficient. Cases of enforced disappearances, which were either excluded on technical grounds by the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, or occurred after the Commission's process 16 ended, remained unresolved. Morocco has declared that the CNDH has been mandated to deal with such cases. However, according to various sources, a lack of accountability and investigation into allegations of human rights violations against Western Saharans remained a maj or concern during the reporting period. 75. Pursuant to an agreement with Algeria and the Polisario Front, OHCHR dispatched a technical mission to the Western Saharan refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, from 29 July to 4 August 2015. This mission, which was preceded by meetings with Government officials in Algiers, enabled OHCHR to gather first-hand information and gain greater understanding of the human rights situation and challenges in the camps and to explore forms of future cooperation to ensure effective human rights protection for all. MINURSO provided logistical support during the mission. 76. With the cooperation of the Polisario Front and the Algerian authorities, the delegation visited three of the five refugee camps near Tindouf, namely Awserd, Smara, and Laayoune. The delegation was able to meet with various interlocutors of the delegation's choice, including representatives of the Polisario Front, the "Sahrawi Committee for Human Rights" and civil society representatives, including interlocutors critical of the Polisario Front. The delegation also met with Western Saharan refugees, victims, and family members of victims of past enforced disappearances, without any limitations. 77. In the refugee camps, the delegation witnessed visible efforts to ensure, within the limited resources available, access to education, health care, administration of justice, and preservation of cultural heritage. Available information did not reveal a pattern of human rights violations and abuses by the Polisario Front. The dire humanitarian situation, coupled with the absence of access to natural wealth and resources in Western Sahara west of the berm, prevents the Western Saharans in the refugee camps from enjoying their economic, social, and cultural rights. 78. The 'jurisdiction' of the 'military court' established by the Polisario Front had traditionally encompassed the investigation and trial of people accused of 'crimes against security' until 2012, when a 'decision' transferred some crimes, including drug-related crimes, from the 'jurisdiction' of 'civil courts' to that of a 'military court'. The previous report had cited this as an area of concern (S/2015/246, paragraph 63). On 16 August 2015, a 'decision' was issued limiting the jurisdiction of the 'military court' to 'security crimes'. However, it did not apply retroactively to ongoing cases, as stated in its article 5. This reportedly included the cases of a number of civilians whom the 'military court' convicted on charges of drug trafficking and sentenced to prison terms on 14 September 2015. 79. The few human rights groups that exist in the refugee camps continued to operate freely without any reported impediments. However, repeated requests for recognized status submitted by a human rights group advocating against alleged slavery and calling for equal representation of dark-skinned Western Saharans in public positions, was still pending as of 31 March 2016. During the reporting period, the Polisario Front and civil society actors reportedly made concerted efforts to eradicate alleged slavery-like conditions and solved at least 15 such cases. 80. During the reporting period, individuals and groups continued to express a diversity of views, to mount small demonstrations and the few existing private electronic media in the 17 refugee camps continued to operate, including with criticism of the leadership and its management of the refugee camps. Movement within the five refugee camps and surrounding areas, including Rabouni, continued essentially to be free, although regulated by Polisario Front security checkpoints and a night time curfew. 81. The Polisario Front continued to express a readiness to cooperate with all United Nations human rights activities, while insisting that this cooperation should not be a substitute for a human rights component in the MINURSO mandate. Morocco maintained repeatedly that OHCHR should work with Algeria, the host country, in dealing with human rights in the refugee camps. 82. During my meeting with Mr. Abdelaziz, I raised the cases of three young women reportedly held against their will by their families in the refugee camps for different periods. Mr. Abdelaziz promised to pay special attention to resolving these cases, while reminding me that appropriate processes had already been initiated. VII. African Union 83. Until the Moroccan request that the three African Union personnel to leave Laayoune, M1NURSO continued its cooperation with the observer delegation of the African Union led by Ambassador Yilma Tadesse (Ethiopia) as well as its support for the delegation with logistical and administrative assistance drawn from its existing resources. On 18 March, the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU issued a statement deploring Morocco's decision to remove personnel from MINURSO. She also stressed the need to make progressin the political process and called for the international community to p